With the continuous development of IoT (Internet of Things) technology, IoT has become a typical representative of the development of new generation of information technology. The IoT allows people to use our data and computing resource anytime and everywhere. In the context of the IoT, the security of the vast amount of data generated by smart devices is one of the biggest concerns. To meet the challenge, the user authentication scheme in IoT should ensure the essential security performance protection and low computing costs. A authentication protocol preserving user anonymity was proposed by Nikooghadam et al. in 2017. In this paper, we further analyze the security of Nikooghadam et al.'s protocol and propose an improved anonymous authentication protocol for IoT. We use the timestamp mechanism and rely on CDH (Computational Diffie-Hellman) problem to improve security primarily. The security of the proposed protocol is verified using BAN logic and the performance comparison and efficiency analysis are carried out. The results show that our improved protocol has higher security with little more computation cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of things (IoT) is the extension and expansion of the Internet. Since the first mention of IoT concept in 1999 by Ashton, IoT has become a typical representative of the development of a new generation of information and communication technologies, which has profoundly changed human production and lifestyle, such as communication through the Internet, online shopping, online games, electronic medical record systems [1] . Hence in 2012, International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T) defined IoT as ''a global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced ser-vices by interconnecting virtual and physical things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies [2] , [3] .'' The ubiquitous smart society, in which the combining of the data from smart devices and various sensors enables intelligent communication, is being built in the form of the smart city [4] , [5] . But the components made by different sensors limit the capacity of IoT and cannot manage the large amounts of data generated by The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jagruti Sahoo. connected devices. A powerful technology, such as a cloud, is needed to access information from anywhere. Currently, many cloud services are available from public and private servers in geographic locations. Often, public cloud platforms are essential for all users and private cloud open services because they are not accessible without authorization. Cloud computing [6] , [7] plays a key role in the implementation of IoT, but cloud security is an important issue. An attacker could compromise the security of the system and illegally access user data. For example, when a doctor is a remote user and a patient communicates through IoT in the home or an attacker uses smartphones to lock or unlock doors from a distance, there will be a security risk. A variety of authentication protocols can be used to ensure information security. User authentication is required to enable user mobile devices to access various services. The user identifier can be relied upon to verify that the user is legitimate in the authentication. Identifiers such as passwords are associated with user privacy and seriously affect user security when compromised. Therefore, login and authentication requests for users who use identifiers to transfer to the public channel can easily become the target of an attacker. Due to this problem, it is necessary to protect the user's anonymity, intractability and other related information problems in the authentication process [8] . At the earliest, only password authentication is used [9] . However, with the continuous development of the field, especially the leakage of sensitive information such as medical care and bank branch information. The researchers found that can no longer rely on password to ensure that the network information security. So the remote user authentication scheme based on smart card has become a hotspot in the field of security protocols [10] . Chang and Wu [11] proposed the first authentication scheme that combines smart cards and passwords to protect security-critical services such as online banking and e-health. But most of the early two-factor [12] , [13] security protocols relied heavily on the tamper-proof features [14] - [16] of smart cards [17] . The research results on side-channel attacks reveal that smart cards can no longer be fully trusted once in the hands of a attacker. They can be tampered by power analysis [18] . In 2016, Das [19] proposed a new three-factor [20] user authentication scheme to overcome the disadvantages in Jiang er al.'s [21] two-factor user authentication scheme. In particular, the biometric-based three-factor authentication method has become a key technology for solving the certification problem. Since biometrics represent unique human characteristics, such as iris, fingerprint, and hand geometry, it has the following advantages [22] : (1) Biometric keys cannot be lost or forgotten;
(2) it is extremely difficult to forge or distribute biometric keys; (3) biometric keys maintain uniqueness; and (4) it is difficult to guess biometric keys. Thus, it is obvious that the biometric-based user authentication methods are more secure and reliable than the traditional password-based user authentication methods. However, when applying biometricbased authentication technology in practice, it is not a simple matter, and some considerations need to be paid attention to. As mentioned earlier, biometrics are a characteristic of humans, so it cannot be altered like a password. Therefore, if it is leaked, it will lead to serious privacy problems [23] . The original biometric template cannot be directly exported. In this regard, many authentication schemes based on biometric have been proposed using techniques for extracting user's biometrics into a random value such as a bio-hash or a fuzzy extractor [24] , [25] . With further development, the concept of dynamic identity [26] - [28] was developed. Scholars have done a lot of research on remote user authentication scheme based on dynamic identity. How to ensure the security of users' privacy information has become an important problem restricting the development of communication network technology and anonymous authentication technology has become an effective strategy to solve the problem of communication network security.
Chang et al. [29] proposed untraceable dunamic-identitybased remote user authentication scheme in 2013. In 2014, Kumari et al. [30] proved that the scheme proposed by Chang [17] analysed the scheme of Kumari et al. and found it is susceptible to de-synchronization attack, not attain forward secrecy. In the same year, Chen et al. claimed that the Kumari et al. scheme is vulnerable to stolen smart card attack and failed to ensure forward secrecy, user anonymity. In 2018, Limbasiya et al. [31] showed that the scheme proposed by Kumari Then, we propose an improved protocol. In terms of protocol security analysis, there are three types of typical formal analysis methods: theorem proving, logical derivation, and modei detection. Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic (BAN logic) [35] , [36] is a wide logic derivation method, so we analyze our protocol by BAN logic. Many scholars also use Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) [37] to analyze the security of the protocol. In addition, by integrating ''honeywords'', traditionally the purview of system security, with a ''fuzzyverifier'', Wang et al. hits ''two birds'': it not only eliminates the long-standing security-usability conflict that is considered intractable in the literature, but also achieves security guarantees beyond the conventional optimal security bound [38] . For better balance between security and usability, our protocol employs the techniques of ''fuzzy-verifier'' in the login phase. In the security analysis, we have shown that the proposed protocol could withstand well-known security attacks and provide the mutual authentication between the user and the server. Furthermore, the performance comparison among the proposed scheme and other schemes and total execution time comparison among discrete systems are carried out in Table 2 and Table 4 . These analyses indicate that our protocol is more secure and little more computation cost.
II. REVIEW OF NIKOOGHADAM ET AL.'S SCHEME
Nikooghadamet al.'s protocol includes three phases: registration phase, login and authentication phase, and password changing phase. The employed symbols in the proposed protocol are defined in Table 1 . 
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
In the registration phase, the following steps are performed in order to issue a smart card that the user U i employs it during login the server.
B. LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION PHASE
In this phase, the user and server authenticate each other and then they agree on a session key. After the authentication and key agreement, the user and the server are able to encrypt/authenticate their messages using the agreed session key. Figure 2 illustrates the login and authentication phase of the proposed protocol.
C. PASSWORD CHANGING PHASE
In this phase, When a user decides to change the password, he/she inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and enters his/her identity and current password. Then the smart card works as follows:
Step1: This step is the same as Step 
Finally, the smart card replaces B New i and MID New i with B i and MID i , respectively.
III. WEAKNESSES OF NIKOOGHADAM ET AL.'S SCHEME A. WEAKNESS 1: REPLAY ATTACK
Timestamps have not been used by U i to change M 2 or by the server to verify the response M 3 during authentication. This would cause the validation period of these message (M 2 , M 3 ) to be endless. If A intercepts M 2 , then she/he can stop or delay it longer. Consequently, if U i asks for resources, A can use this request later to obtain unauthorized services, as the server cannot identify that a request has been sent by a legitimate user or that A has sent requests illegitimately. Such as A can request the server to calculate SK . Step1: Insider A knows the U i s identity ID i from the received registration request {ID i , MPW i } where MPW i = h(ID i ||r||PW i ). And A can get the message 
D. WEAKNESS 4: SERVER SPOOFING ATTACK
An intruder exploits recorded information of authorized users by counterfeiting as a server. To successfully impersonate as a legitimate server and forge a valid response message. A acquires the information {B i , MID i , r, E key (·)/D key (·), h(·)} from the smart card. As a co-worker in the same organization, A has knowledge of ID i and MPW i as well as r. Then, A computes A i = B i ⊕ MPW i . A computes D Ai (M 1 ) = (ID i ||RN i ||Ti||MID i ) and intercepts the log-in message {MID i , M 1 , Ti}. Timestamps have not been used by U i to challenge M 2 or by the server to verify the response M 3 during authentication. A chooses random number RN and computer M 2 = E Ai (MID i ||RN s ||ID i ||RN i ). Finally, A sends {M 2 } to user. A can act as the legal server.
E. WEAKNESS 5: USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
In this threat, A acts as a legal U i after generating the U i s correct log-in message. The Nikooghadam et al.'s protocol cannot protect from user impersonation attack, which is illustrated as follows:
Step1: A acquiers the information {B i , MID i , r, E key (·)/D key (·), h(·)} from the smart card. Step2: A intercepts the log-in message {MID i , M 1 , Ti}.
Step3: As a co-worker in the same organization, A has knowledge of ID i and MPW i as well as r. A can compute A i = B i ⊕ MPW i . Step4: A creats a random nonce RN i and calculates M 1 = E Ai (ID i ||RN i ||Ti||MID i ). After that, she/he sends the log-in request message {MID i , M 1 , Ti} to the server. Step5: The server authenticates the message {MID i , M 1 , Ti} as valid owing to the true ID i . A can act as the legal U i .
IV. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a secure authentication and key agreement protocol to overcome the weaknesses of Nikooghadam et al.'s protocol. The proposed protocol includes four phases: registration phase, login phase, authentication phase, and password change phase. The employed symbols in the proposed protocol are defined in Table 1 .
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
In this phase, a user can register with the server. When the registration process is completed, the user obtains a personalized smart card from the server. The user's private information that is required for the next phase will save in the smart card. The registration process is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
B. LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION PHASE
A legal user can access to the services of the server when inserts the smart card into a card reader and enters identity, and password. The registration process is illustrated in Fig. 4 . 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security analysis of the proposed scheme is presented. The analysis confirms that the proposed scheme is resistant against the all the major network attacks.
A. REPLAY ATTACK
Timestamps have been used by U i to change M 2 and by the server to verify the response M 3 during authentication. If A intercepts M 2 , she/he cannot stop or delay it longer. If U i asks for resources, A cannot use this request later to obtain unauthorized services, as the server can identify that a request has been sent by a legitimate user or that A has sent requests illegitimately. Hence, we can say that the proposed system is secure against replay attack.
B. PRIVILEGED INSIDER ATTACK AND OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
The proposed scheme is adequate to secure against privileged insider attack and password guessing attack. In the registration phase, PID i = h(ID i ||r), ID i is never sent in plaintext. Insider A cannot get the U i s identity ID i from the received registration request {PID i , MPW i } where PID i = h(ID i ||r). A cannot compute A i = h((h(ID i ||r) ⊕ h(ID i ||r||PW i )) mod n 0 ) without ID i . A cannot make password guesses and the proposed protocol is secure.
C. KNOWN SESSION SPECIFIC TEMPORARY INFORMATION ATTACK
In the authentication phase, the proposed protocol uses the timestamp mechanism and Computational Diffie-Hellman to provide session specific information attack. The session key SK = h(RN i ||A i * ||RN s ||T 4 ||R 4 ), where RN i and RN s are generated freshly for each session. And the timestamp mechanism means the session message is not the latest. It is a computational difficult problem to guess abP provided aP and bP.
D. SERVER SPOOFING ATTACK
An intruder cannot exploit recorded information of authorized users by counterfeiting as a server. A acquires the information {MID i , r, E key (·)/D key (·), h(·)} from the smart card. A does not have knowledge of ID i as well as r. Because ID i is never sent in plaintext. Timestamps have been used by U i to challenge M 2 . Therefore, A cannot send false information {M 2 } to user and cannot act as the legal server.
E. USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
A cannot calculate M 1 = E Ai * (ID i * ||RN i ||Ti||MID i ) without the non-plaintext message ID i . A cannot act as the legal U i by sending the log-in request message {MID i , M 1 , Ti} to the server. The anonymity of users is also realized to a certain extent. The proposed system is secure against user impersonation attack.
VI. AUTHENTICATION PROOF BASED ON BAN LOGIC
In this section, we use the BAN logic, which is a formal method for analyzing authentication protocols, to prove the correctness of the proposed protocol. This logic has some rules that are defined in the following.
The message-meaning rule:
The freshness rule: Nonce-verification rule:
According to the procedure of the BAN logic, the proposed protocol must access the following goals:
The proposed protocol is transformed to the idealized form as follows.
Message 1 : User → Server :
Message 2 : Server → User :
We made the assumptions about the initial state of the proposed protocol. 
Based on the BAN logic rules and the assumptions, we analyze the idealized form of the proposed protocol as follows.
According to the Message 1, we have:
According to the Message 2, we have:
From H 1 , R 3 , we have:
From H 3 , R 4 , we have:
From H 2 , the session key SK = h(RN i ||A i * ||RN s ||T 4 ||R 3 ), and R 5 , we have:
From H 5 , R 6 , we have:
According to the Message 3, we have:
From H 7 , R 8 , we have:
From H 4 , R 9 , we have: 
VII. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
To evaluate the computational time analysis, we account T h(·) ≈ 0.0023ms, T E/D ≈ 0.0046ms, T || and T ⊕ require very little to perform and are not included in the total time calculation. According to the Table3 and Table4, our protocol provides more security features with the addition of a small amount of computation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have cryptanalyzed Nikooghadam et al.'s scheme and found that it is vulnerable to various security threats, such as replay attack, privileged insider attack and password guessing attack, session specific temporary information attack, server spoofing attack, and user impersonation attack. In addition, we have designed an improved authentication protocol using smart cards for the Internet of things based on Nikooghadam et al.'s protocol framework. The proposed protocol uses the timestamp mechanism and relies on CDH (Computational Diffie-Hellman) problem to improve security primarily. We have used BAN logic, which validates that the proposed protocol could withstand well-known security attacks and provide the mutual authentication between the user and the server. The performance comparison and efficiency analysis indicate that our protocol is more secure and little more computation cost. 
